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Mr. Trump and the Forgotten Man 
 
President-elect Donald Trump’s unexpected victory—at least for most prognosticators—  
generated an analysis avalanche along with thoughtful commentary on what we might 
expect in the way of economic policy changes.1  .In his victory, Mr. Trump spoke of the 
importance of making life better for all Americans.  He then referred to the Forgotten 
                                            
1
 This section is based on Bruce Yandle, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/why-do-we-forget-the-
forgotten-man/article/2607803. 
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Man:  “Every single American will have the opportunity to realize his or her fullest 
potential. The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer.”   
 
Trump’s speech writers knew exactly what they were doing when they suggested the 
Forgotten Man reference.  They undoubtedly knew that the expression came from 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s famous April 7, 1932, Depression-era campaign speech.  
In his speech, FDR made reference to the horrors of World War I, pointing out that the 
1932 depression crisis was far more serious.  He then made reference to the policies of 
the Hoover Administration and introduced the Forgotten Man: 
It is said that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo because he forgot his infantry — he 
staked too much upon the more spectacular but less substantial cavalry. The present 
administration in Washington provides a close parallel. It has either forgotten or it does 
not want to remember the infantry of our economic army.  
These unhappy times call for the building of plans that rest upon the forgotten, the 
unorganized but the indispensable units of economic power for plans like those of 1917 
that build from the bottom up and not from the top down, that put their faith once more in 
the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid.  
Like Mr. Trump, FDR was a wealthy populist who was swept into office by voters across 
the land who, disgusted with Washington’s business-as-usual failed policies, were 
desperate for change. But while the fact of winning is similar for the two of them, it must 
be remembered that in his campaign against incumbent Herbert Hoover FDR carried 42 
of the then 48 states and gained 57 percent of the popular vote.  Mr. Trump carried 31 
of 50 states and the District of Columbia and lost the popular vote count.  Like Mr. 
Trump, FDR turned on his Wall Street buddies and called for embarking on a huge 
infrastructure project.  He would later attempt to put America first when it came to 
limiting immigration from war-torn Europe.  Roosevelt, too, remembered the Forgotten 
Man, those ravished by the depression.  But unlike Mr. Trump, Roosevelt was a dyed-
in-the-wool Democrat and a successful politician who had governed the state of New 
York and rendered service to the nation in Washington.  And unlike Mr. Trump, 
Roosevelt was one of the greatest orators of his day. 
Can Public Choice economics explain the Forgotten Man? 
The question in FDR’s time as well as today is this:  How did the Forgotten Man get to 
be forgotten?  A major part of the answer to the question comes to us from Public 
Choice economics.  By definition, the Forgotten Man is a part of a large but politically 
unorganized component of society. Otherwise, he would not be called forgotten. Though 
all such men taken together have common interests, they do not form a politically 
important interest group.  No one seeking national office typically needs to curry their 
favor.  Unlike organized interest groups—the teachers and labor unions, 
environmentalists, business and financial interests, ethanol producers, corporate 
farmers and cattlemen, and some minority groups—each member of the unorganized 
forgotten ones can be thought of as being interchangeable with others in that same 
3 
 
group.  Sure, their votes matter, but their support—most of the time—is not essential to 
a candidate seeking to gain political power, at least until they awaken and rebel.  Seen 
another way, it is very costly to organize the unorganized Forgotten Men, unless 
technology change reduces the cost of doing so.  Smart phone technology and related 
social media may have done just that. 
Using the forgotten man to make a policy change forecast 
The forgotten tend to become invisible…until they rise up.  And why did they raise their 
voices this time?  What were the all-encompassing issues that motivated rank-and-file 
lower income, less-educated Americans to get out and vote this time, but not before?  I 
don’t think the answer to these questions involves closing of industrial plants, rising 
immigration, and falling opportunities for less-educated workers.  These three forces 
have been playing through the economy for a long time. I consider them to be 
background forces. They may have set the conditions for the political action we 
observed, but I don’t think they ignited the action. I suggest three events triggered the 
revolution.  The triggers form the basis for a forecast for Trump political action. 
Here are the three triggering events:  
1) The suddenly rising cost of the Obamacare mandate and the timing of the premium 
announcements;  
2) The “clean energy” push by the Executive Branch, now delayed by a court decision, 
that sharply accelerated the demise of the natural gas threatened, coal producing 
economy, and 
3) The highly visible wealth effects generated by federal policies that slowed community 
bank lending and brought interest rates almost to zero on the savings of ordinary folks 
while fueling massive increases in wealth for the Wall Street savvy elite.  
And so what might be the resulting policy changes that come from all this? 
 Sharp revisions that will bring more competitive outcomes to Obamacare, 
 Changes in Dodd-Frank that will soften financial institution regulation, 
 Reductions in taxes and a call for higher interest rates, and 
 Enhanced emphasis on economic consequences of environmental policy. 
These high priority changes will be folded into actions that relate to the background 
issues: trade and immigration policy. 
Can the high priority changes improve productivity and America’s GDP growth path, all 
else the same?  Of course, the details matter, but I think that all else equal these policy 
changes will result in faster paced economic activity. But the GDP growth effects will not 
be seen for 18 to 24 months.  Before clearing our throats for a muted shout of 
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celebration, we must remember that “all else will not be equal.”  I will consider political 
promises later in the report that may cut the other way, especially trade policy 
Speeding Up in the Slow Lane:  Did Someone Say GDP Growth? 
October’s estimate for third quarter real GDP growth brought smiles on lots of slow-
growth weary observers.  Indeed, the 3.2% final estimate exceeded the consensus by 
almost a percentage point.  I provide data on the quarterly growth rate and 4-quarter 
moving average in the next chart.  The moving average indicates annual growth has 
turned toward 3.0%, which, once upon a time, was the long-run average rate of growth.  
But given the very pale first half, heading toward 3.0% may be as good it will get…, for a 
while.  When the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s hot 3.6% projection for 4Q2016 
growth is considered, shown in the next chart, we may at least approach a 2016 annual 
growth of 2.0%.  
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Will our major trading partners contribute to improved GDP growth? 
Breaking the 3.0% growth barrier will be helped a lot if our trading partners’ ramp up 
their purchases of U.S. goods, which happens when their GDP growth improves.  The 
International Monetary Fund sees better times ahead for the world and for the United 
States, Mexico and Canada, our largest trading partner.  In the next chart, we see a 
mixed bag of outcomes for other industrialized countries,   
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What about Global Trade and Mr. Trump’s Promises? 
It’s good to see an optimistic 2017 forecast, 
because in late September, the World Trade 
Organization indicated that growth in global trade 
for 2016 would fall to the lowest level since 2008. 
The growth slowdown is explained primarily by the 
generally slow pace of world economic activity, 
particularly for commodity producing countries. But 
anti-trade sentiments being registered around the 
world, like those of Mr. Trump, may also keep 
growth in the cellar.  
 In the recent campaign, both presidential 
candidates Clinton and Trump sounded off about 
the loss of U.S. manufacturing job and how trade 
agreements that promise to make things better 
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could really make things worse, especially for American workers.  The campaign 
rhetoric matched the sentiments of people across the U.S. and advanced economies 
but not for those polled from the developing world.  Ironically, in a way, those countries 
that have flourished because of open markets and trade are the same countries that are 
ready to put rocks in harbors…, at least for a while. 
President-elect Trump has promised to play hardball when it comes to trade deals and 
foreign access to American markets. In his struggle to be elected, he called for 45% 
tariffs on Chinese goods, renegotiation of NAFTA, and an end to effort to form multi-
national trade agreements.  Holding true to this campaign rhetoric would lead to trade 
wars, production shifts away from countries being punished to those that are not and, 
while these adjustments were underway,  the beginning of a significant recession.  Put 
another way, we could forget about the rosy forecast provided earlier in this report. 
What about the record?  What do data tell us about U.S. trade in manufactured goods?  
Are we really losing ground? 
Let’s consider some data   
While there are clearly trade-induced employment dislocations that have beset major 
U.S. manufacturing industries, such as furniture, textiles, and some parts of the 
automobile industry, it is just as clear that manufacturing exports have not suffered. In 
fact, U.S. real manufacturing exports have increased six-fold since 1980.  Obviously, 
the composition of exports has changed.  Perhaps of greater interest, given the rise of 
the U.S. knowledge economy, it is the services sector’s exports that set the higher pace 
for U.S. trade. Trade in that sector has grown six-fold since 1980.  The share of services 
exports has increased from 18% in 1980 to 30% in 2014, while manufacturing’s share 
has held its own. 
But there is still another part of the story that deserves to be considered.  Not only has 
the composition of traded goods and services changed, for example from furniture to 
electronic machinery, the share accounted for by intermediate components has 
exploded.  According to the Economist magazine, 2005 trade in intermediate inputs 
accounted for 56% of goods and 73% of services that crossed national borders.2  
Simply put, the days when built-from-scratch automobiles in one country were exported 
to other countries have long been dead.  
 Writing about this in his 2016 book, Door to Door, Edward Humes explains that at least 
24 primary suppliers on three continents provide the content for Apple’s IPhone 6 Plus.3  
                                            
2
 Free Exchange, The Economist, August 13, 2016, 57. 
3
 Edward Humes, Door to Door, New York: HarperCollins, 2016: 24. 
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In some cases, the same component parts are shipped back and forth across countries 
as they become finished parts for final assembly.  Humes estimates iPhone 6 
components travel 240,000 miles as they move from country to country and finally to 
assembly in China where 128,000 workers are employed making phones.  In other 
words, component manufacturing and processing weaves economic fabric that 
encompasses the globe. Specialization expands and employment and incomes grow 
along the way, but the process is not so simple as to say “the U.S. has a problem with 
China” or “If you elect me, I will bring jobs back to America’s steel making centers.”  
Has America Lost Manufacturing Muscle? 
Each morning we awake to a new economy, one that is a wee bit different from the one 
we put to bed the evening before.  The differences are small, so small that they cannot 
be detected, but change is there nonetheless.  To detect the change, we must do so at 
a distance, perhaps a few quarters at a time, better yet, with the perspective of a few 
years.  Consider manufacturing.  We know that services has become the dominant 
economic sector.  But have we lost our manufacturing muscle? 
One answer to the question is found in Federal Reserve production data in the form of 
an index for manufacturing, where 2012 = 100.  The accompanying chart shows the 
index from 1990 forward.  As can be readily observed, the index is a bit lower now (103) 
than it was just before the start of the 2008 recession (110).  A glance further back tells 
us that even though a bit lower, the index is still ranging above the level of previous 
decades.  Yes, declining exports are part of the story.  There is not as much 
manufacturing muscle as there was in 2008, but there is still a lot of muscle. 
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Some other Federal Reserve data, shown next, tell us which manufacturing sectors are 
strongest.  I have inserted a red line where the index is equal to 100.  Any bars above 
the line indicate levels of production higher than those in 2012. 
 
U.S. Manufacturing Production, 2000 - 2016 
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As we can see, the automotive sector, glass (nonmetallic), computers & electronics, 
plastics & rubber, petroleum and coal, textiles, aerospace, furniture and food have index 
values greater than 100.  I also show the indices for durable and nondurables.  The 
durables sector is the strongest.  Finally, the last manufacturing chart reports growth in 
production for the recent period.  A quick glance here tells us what’s hot and what’s not.  
Sometimes, there are surprises.  Note that textiles is one of America’s surging sectors. 
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What about manufacturing employment? 
Interestingly enough, America, right now, has a manufacturing jobs crisis.  No, it is not 
about job losses.  It is about more job opening and workers to fill them.  Consider the 
accompanying St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank chart.  Here, I’ve mapped Bureau of 
Labor Statistics job opening data with job hires.  Since 2014, the gap has widened.  The 
current gap is 100,000 unfilled jobs.  There are not enough qualified workers to fill the 
openings.  So what happens, if by some magic, a newly elected political leader does 
bring back more job openings?  The gap would get larger, unless the happy leader also 
brought workers to fill the jobs.  In the current environment, the U.S. challenge is not 
about jobs, generally speaking, it is about job dislocations in particular locations.  Of 
course, this is part of the Forgotten Man issue.  There are lots of people in rust-belt 
locations who would love to see nearby closed factories reopened.  They would love to 
respond to the work whistle once more.  Targeting a return of jobs is a tall order, indeed. 
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Are there benefits to consider? 
But what about globalization benefits?  What has happened to the prices of consumer 
goods over the last few decades as U.S. exports and imports have increased?  Do we 
see improvements in the prices of commonly purchased consumer goods?  How do 
those price changes compare with the prices of consumer services where international 
competition hardly makes a dent?  Consider the next chart for some answers.  A picture 
is worth a thousand words. 
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Putting it all in a nutshell summary 
Having discussed possible policy changes, GDP growth projections, and trade 
possibilities, it is time to offer a nutshell summary of what I think lies ahead for 2017.   
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Here’s the picture that I see for the U.S. for 
2017:
 2017 GDP growth will be 2.2%. 
 Inflation will rise a bit.  Look for 2.0%.
 Interest rates will nudge up. 10-yr. bond: 2.50%-
3.00%. Mortgage rate: 4.00%- 4.50%.
 Housing will be strong; autos down.
 The pace of manufacturing activity will accelerate 
from hardly moving to slow, led by machinery.
When the records are in 2016 will be a ho-
hum year.  2017 will look better.
 
 
The Geographic Imprint 
When giving presentations on the economy, I often say that when one asks about the 
economic outlook, I respond by asking “Which zip code do you wish to hear about.”  
The point is a simple one.  Economic activity varies a lot across cities, counties, and 
states.  I begin this section by providing two state outline maps showing state 
unemployment rates.  The most recent one, for October 2016, shows relatively little 
variation across states.  The strong employment markets are seen at the center of the 
map.  Energy, hard grains, and educational attainment still matter.  In contrast the 
accompanying 2011 map shows higher unemployment rates, greater variation across 
states, and when compared with 2016, how unemployment rates have fallen.  A lot has 
happened since 2011.  Lest we forget.  
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Unemployment rates by state,
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We get another 50-state employment picture in the next map.  This one shows 
employment growth in advanced industries.  These are 50 industries that spend 
disproportionately on R&D and employ a high percentage of workers in science, 
engineering, and mathematics.  The darkest blue states can be thought of as the 
locations for America’s cutting edge manufacturing activity. 
 
Finally, I provide a chart produced by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, which 
shows leading indicators for the next six month.  The chart is based on September 2016 
estimates, which means that it is forecasting what the current picture will be in March 
2017.  Nevada and Wyoming are the high growth states, followed by a large number 
colored dark green. 
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Aspiring Presidential Candidates and Stationary Bandits 
Candidate promises that proliferated this year in a seemingly interminable presidential 
campaign brought to mind the late Mancur Olson, a major contributor to formation of the 
field of Public Choice and one of 20th century’s most creative social scientists.4 In his 
Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (Basic 
Books, 2000), Olson uses the metaphor of roving and stationary bandits to explain the 
rise of democracies and to offer insights into political behavior generally.  His notion 
about bandits sheds a bit of light on competing campaign promises. But before looking 
at the matter, we must build a little background. 
Consider for a moment the two bandit categories. Olsen reminds us that when a roving 
bandit breaks into a home, he takes all the valuables he can cart off. The rover has no 
interest in the victim’s long run prosperity; he is interested in his prosperity, which of 
                                            
4
 This section is based on Bruce Yandle, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-
intelligence/articles/2016-10-31/donald-trump-and-hillary-clinton-campaign-promises-are-about-power. 
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course may be short-lived.  In contrast, a stationary bandit, who may be a power lord 
that has somehow seized political control, seeks to maximize tribute that can be taken 
on an ongoing basis.  Like a mafia territorial boss in the business of selling protection, 
he worries about victim productivity, and he knows that excessive tribute payments can 
be debilitating to his victim and therefore to his own prosperity.  Put another way, the 
stationary bandit knows one can fleece a sheep many times, but can skin him only 
once. More to the point, he knows that incentives matter.  It marginal income tax rates 
are set too high, then higher incomes may disappear along with the bandit’s much 
beloved revenue. 
Olson suggests that stationary bandits, which he sees as examples of evolving crude 
governments, protect their territories from invaders; they provide defense and offer 
other government services that help to enhance their harvest. Unlike the rovers, the 
sitting bandits have an all-encompassing interest in prosperity.  Territories operated by 
enlightened stationary bandits then have an advantage over others that are controlled 
by more temporary roving bandits, which is to say, those whose grip on power is apt to 
be short but not sweet.  The seasoned stationary bandit will more readily raise an army 
to defeat rovers, and when doing so will earn the allegiance of his subjects.  The sitting 
ruler will also more likely honor contracts and enforce property rights, since it is in his 
interest to do so.  But what may seem like a successful stationary bandit’s happy 
hunting ground takes on an even healthier complexion for his subjects when other 
stationary bandits operate in competing locations. Though it may be difficult to do so, 
unhappy subjects may vote with their feet, and take their tools with them. 
But how does a stationary bandit determine how much take is too much? How does he 
build his “taxation” agenda?  After all, an effective bandit will not want to leave untapped 
revenue on the table. The question itself gives a hint as to why stationary bandits 
cannot be solo operators.  After all, revolution is a dictator’s greatest fear.  Successful 
stationary bandits must have a strong group of supporter/protectors who help keep the 
crown on the ruler’s head, and his head on his shoulders.  In order to keep power, the 
bandit or ruler must share power.  Sharing power brings knowledge and awareness of 
power limitations.  Sharing power also means formation of aspiring stationary bandits.  
Sometimes forestalling revolution means sharing voice when decisions are made. The 
stationary bandit extends the vote. 
If we apply Olson’s model to American politics, we can think of presidential candidates 
as being hopeful stationary bandits. Though not the kindest moniker we might affix to 
them, the metaphor immediately raises the challenge just mentioned.  How to determine 
how much wool can be sheared and shared with the stationary bandit’s 
supporter/protectors?  In the American case, this severe knowledge problem is 
addressed historically by political parties, primaries, caucuses, conventions, debates, 
and ultimately elections.   But now, Facebook with micro-targeting, can reduce 
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substantially the cost of matching voter and candidate preferences.  With lower 
information costs, we should expect to see better government performance, at least as 
seen in the eyes of the interest groups that help elect new leadership. 
And this brings us finally to campaign promises. 
When candidate Donald Trump promised to cut taxes on high income earners as well 
as on corporate earnings, he bet that the result will lead to faster economic growth and 
more wool to shear for expanding some Trump-preferred government functions like 
building walls and expanding childcare.  But if electorate feedback suggests childcare 
matters more than wall, Mr. Trump can modulate and recalculate.  And when candidate 
Hillary Clinton responded that she would cut middle income taxes and raise taxes on 
the rich, she argued that the adjustment would help empower people whose wool has 
been cut to close to the skin, and that lower middle income taxes would produce more 
future wool for her to shear and use for her party’s favorite causes, such as making 
college education “free” and expanding the production of clean energy.   
Political competition helps to determine the resulting action agenda and which aspiring 
politician will gain power.  But both major party candidates in this year’s election were 
singing Mancur Olson’s stationary bandit’s song.  They both wanted power, and they 
both wanted more revenue to use for their political purposes. 
For the Reading Table 
With all that is being said about labor force participation, various measure of 
unemployment and whether or not labor markets are tight enough for the Fed to justify 
raising rates, books like Nicholas Eberstadt’s Men without Work (Templeton Press, 
2016) need to come around more often.  Eberstadt has one over-riding motivation for 
writing his book.  He seeks to answer this question:  Why does the U.S. have more than 
50 million work-age adults not participating in the economy?  They are not working or 
looking; they are not counted as unemployed.  They are simply nonworkers.  Perhaps, 
they are a part of Mr. Trump’s Forgotten Men and Women. 
Eberstadt’s focus is on the male component of that number, which is some 20 million 
tall.  Why?  Because the number has been rising systematically for decades.  The 
female counterpart has been rather stable.  Eberstadt probes into lots of data.  He 
shows that many of the nonworking men are able to consume at a fairly good level; 
consumption expenditure data show a more positive picture than do income data.  So 
where does the money come from?  There are overlapping disability income programs. 
Multiple family members can play the game and pool the proceeds.  There is also the 
shadow economy where work for cash takes place.   
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Eberstadt seems most frustrated when discussing ex-offender data, the estimated 23 
million people who have served time but are not participating fully in the market 
economy.  His frustration comes from two sources.  First, a large part of this population 
is not working, and cannot easily find work.  Second, there is no systematic counting of 
or reporting on this huge population by any government agency. We are accustomed 
hearing people bemoan the low and falling labor force participation rate, but we hear 
nothing about how sentencing guidelines and prison policies laid the foundation that 
explains a large part of the problem.  I hope Eberstadt’s book will be read widely. 
For those who love good barbecue and want a change of pace from reading relatively 
unflavored economics tomes, Rien Fertel’s The One True Barbecue (New York: 
Touchstone, 2016) could be just the ticket.  In this remarkable read, Fertel traces the 
rise and decline of whole hog cooking.  Along the way, he takes the reader to 15 
locations following a mostly southern swath that goes from Mississippi, to parts of 
Tennessee, but concentrated primarily in coastal North Carolina and the lower part of 
South Carolina.  Somehow, he also manages to visit one somewhat misplaced whole 
hog-cookery in New York City.   
With tasty details provided on the prepping and cooking, Rien focuses mainly on the 
people, the slowly disappearing master cooks who learned their art as young people 
and practiced it carefully to old age.  Consider how he introduces Ricky Parker on the 
book’s opening page: “Whole hogs. Prodigious beasts, 180 to 200 pounds apiece. Fed 
and fattened to his specifications, slaughtered at the local abattoir, head and offal 
removed and ready for roasting and smoking in his cinder-block pits.  This is what Ricky 
called barbecue. Whole-hog barbecue.  The only barbecue that he and all of Lexington, 
Tennessee, ever knew. The one true barbecue: a hog, slow simmered over hickory 
coals and ash, its flesh and fat and skin primed for the cleaver and chopping block after 
twenty-plus hours.  Bathed in smoke and massaged by fire.”   
Along with discussions of the relative merits of tomato- and mustard-based to no sauce 
at all, the book is filled with stories about dedicated, almost loveable, pitmasters who 
prided themselves in the quality and quantity of whole hogs they convert to sumptuous, 
juicy barbecue.  And the name?  Where does the word come from?  The reader will 
learn that barbecue is derived from a French term associated with the apparatus, the 
framework, used for cooking.  And that explains why there is a Barbecue Creek in 
coastal North Carolina, named so by a Scottish Highlander who upon seeing early 
morning mist rising from the creek was reminded of his sailor days in the Caribbean 
watching native islanders roasting meat using the French apparatus. Located nearby is 
Barbecue Presbyterian Church, founded in 1758.  I hope you will read and enjoy the 
book.  Better yet, I hope you find some delicious barbecue. 
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Finally, I must shamelessly offer a review of Kathryn Smith’s book, The Gatekeeper: 
Missy LeHand, FDR, and the Untold Story of the Partnership that Defined a Presidency 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).  Kathryn, my much-admired daughter, devoted 
almost three years to the research and writing that produced this first biography of 
Missy LeHand, the first women to become a president’s chief of staff. LeHand worked 
with FDR from 1920 when he ran for vice president until 1941 when she suffered a 
massive stroke. The adept and polished LeHand managed the White House flow of 
people and activities during one of the nation’s most challenging periods.  As FDR’s 
gatekeeper, she also often served as White House hostess in place of First Lady 
Eleanor, a tireless globetrotter who was constantly engaged in other social and political 
enterprises. Kathryn gained access to as yet unpublished letters and film from LeHand’s 
nieces and used that material to supplement other research to provide a memorable 
account of FDR’s personal and political struggles.  Gaining an appreciation of 
Roosevelt’s polio struggle is key to understanding the man himself.  Missy LeHand 
played a critical role as booster, companion, and partner in FDR’s successful battle to 
struggle to his feet and lead the nation through the Great Depression and World War II. 
FDR fan and foes alike, and their numbers are legion, will appreciate this heavily 
documented biography of Missy LeHand’s extraordinary professional life.  
 
